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NOTE

THE “BROADEST REASONABLE INTERPRETATION” AND
APPLYING ISSUE PRECLUSION TO ADMINISTRATIVE
PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
Jonathan I. Tietz*
Inventions are tangible. Yet patents comprise words, and words are imprecise. Thus, disputes over patents involve a process known as “claim construction,” which formally clarifies the meaning of a patent claim’s words and,
therefore, the scope of the underlying property right. Adversarial claim construction commonly occurs in various Article III and Article I settings, such
as district courts or the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). When these
proceedings ignore each other’s claim constructions, a patent’s scope can become inconsistent and unpredictable. The doctrine of issue preclusion could
help with this problem. The Supreme Court recently reemphasized in B & B
Hardware v. Hargis Industries that administrative decisions can have issue
preclusive effect. But district courts and the PTAB use formally different legal
standards in claim construction, where the district court takes a narrower
view of a patent’s scope. This Note contends that a claim construction determination made by the PTAB under the “broadest reasonable interpretation”
standard should, indeed, be the broadest reasonable interpretation of a
claim. To facilitate uniformity and public notice, issue preclusion should be
applied such that the PTAB’s “broadest reasonable interpretation” is an outer
interpretive bound of a patent’s scope in subsequent district court litigation.
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Introduction
The archetypical invention is a specific, tangible thing: an antibacterial
chemical compound, a wine opener, a self-driving robot, a steam engine. 1
But the patents that protect inventions are intangible and abstract 2—
reducing a physical thing to words creates uncertainty. The law endeavors to
make the scope of patents reasonably certain, but this is difficult because

1. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); MPEP § 2106 (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018).
2. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002)
(“An invention exists most importantly as a tangible structure or a series of drawings. A verbal
portrayal is usually an afterthought written to satisfy the requirements of patent law. . . . Things
are not made for the sake of words, but words for things.” (quoting Autogiro Co. of Am. v.
United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967)).
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language is unavoidably imprecise. Even with an established evidentiary hierarchy, a settled interpretive procedure, and a body of case law governing
interpretive principles, there is room to disagree. At nearly every patentrelated proceeding, an adjudicating body must determine what exactly the
patent in question means.
Yet patent infringement is a strict-liability offense: it is more or less irrelevant whether an infringer knows ex ante the precise scope of a patent’s
protectable subject matter. 3 This scope is fuzzy, and it can vary across time,
space, legal doctrine, and branch of the government. Ultimately, liability can
turn on what seem like minutiae.
To add to the confusion, a patent might be held invalid in one setting
and valid in another—for instance, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
(PTAB) might find a patent invalid in one action while the International
Trade Commission (ITC), in a second action, simultaneously finds it not only valid but infringed. 4 Paul Gugliuzza calls these “Schrödinger[’s] patents,” 5
evoking the famous quantum-mechanics thought experiment involving a
simultaneously alive-and-dead cat. 6 But there are other troubling opportunities for inconsistency beyond this extreme. For instance, a patent owner
might ask a court to construe the scope of a patent narrowly when the validity of the patent is in question, so as to discourage the court from finding impermissible (unpatentable) overlap with inventions already in the public
domain. 7 The same patent owner might then argue for a broad construction
when suing for infringement, hoping to expand the scope of protection. 8
This might make strategic sense for a patent owner, 9 but it is worrisome
when considering that a patent is meant to involve a fair trade of limited exclusivity (for the patentee) for disclosure of something useful (for society). 10
That bargain is frustrated when the actual scope of a patent varies by the day
and by the courtroom.
3. Direct infringement, that is. See Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct.
1920, 1926 (2015) (“Direct infringement is a strict-liability offense.”). Induced infringement
does contain a scienter requirement, but this concerns only the existence of the patent, not the
validity of its claims. See id. at 1928–30.
4. See infra notes 79–82 and accompanying text.
5. Paul R. Gugliuzza, (In)valid Patents, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 271, 272–73, 330
(2016).
6. E. Schrödinger, Die gegenwärtige Situation in der Quantenmechanik [The Current
Situation in Quantum Mechanics], 23 Naturwissenschaften 807, 812 (1935); see also Schrödinger’s Cat, Simple Eng. Wikipedia, https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schrödinger%27s_cat
[https://perma.cc/GDS2-Z4FM].
7. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 57 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2197,
2225, 2240–41 (2016) (describing problem of strategically inconsistent patent scope arguments
between infringement and validity contexts).
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966); Jacob S. Sherkow, Patent Law’s
Reproducibility Paradox, 66 Duke L.J. 845, 848 (2017) (“Patents serve as a quid pro quo: inventors publicly disclose their inventions in return for exclusionary rights.”).
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But the law has a general solution for such inconsistencies: issue preclusion (also known as collateral estoppel). Under this doctrine, a litigant generally has one—and only one—opportunity to try a given issue in court, and
that issue is treated as already decided if raised later. 11 Issue preclusion is especially appropriate in the context of property right delineation, including
patent litigation. 12 For instance, a patent owner is estopped from asserting a
patent previously held invalid, even where the parties in the two actions are
not mutual. 13 Similarly, preclusion can apply to subsidiary issues, such as determinations of patent meaning. 14
Patents, however, play a key role in contentious administrative determinations, and this presents a complication. Some judges, while comfortable
with issue preclusion between courts, have been hesitant to recognize the
principle in an administrative context, often articulating separation-ofpowers concerns. 15 This is perhaps intuitive when an administrative body is
acting outside its core institutional competence. 16 But it is less so when an
administrative body is charged with subject-matter expertise. The Supreme
Court recently emphasized in B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries,

11. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (Am. Law Inst. 1982) (“When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the
determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent
action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.”); see also Reese v. Verizon Cal., Inc., 498 F. App’x 980, 982 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[C]ollateral estoppel . . . prevents a
plaintiff who previously litigated a claim . . . (and lost) from taking ‘another bite at the apple’ . . . .”).
12. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments ch. 3, topic 2, tit. E, intro. note (“The
view has been expressed by some commentators that the applicability of issue preclusion ought
perhaps to vary with the subject matter—broad in cases involving questions of property and
status, where the need for stability is clearest . . . .”); 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012) (“Subject to the
provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes of personal property.”); Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730–31 (2002) (“[A patent] is a property right; and like any property right, its boundaries should be clear.”).
13. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 349–50 (1971).
14. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
15. E.g., B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1318 (2015)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (questioning “whether applying administrative preclusion to a core
factual determination in a private-rights dispute comports with the separation of powers”); see
also David A. Brown, Note, Collateral Estoppel Effects of Administrative Agency Determinations: Where Should Federal Courts Draw the Line?, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 817, 820 n.18 (1988)
(noting more hesitation on issues of law).
16. See, e.g., Campbell v. Ark. Dep’t of Correction, 155 F.3d 950, 960 (8th Cir. 1998)
(“Issue preclusion does not apply with equal force to all administrative proceedings . . . .”);
Edmundson v. Borough of Kennett Square, 4 F.3d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[W]e do not think
that an administrative agency consisting of lay persons has the expertise to issue binding pronouncements in the area of federal constitutional law. Our determination not to grant the
Commission’s ruling preclusive effect is based on the considerations listed in Astoria—the
rights at stake, as well as the power and relative adequacy of state procedures in this highly specialized area.”).
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Inc. 17 that administrative determinations can, when appropriate, have preclusive effects in later judicial proceedings if a two-step test is met. 18 The impact of B & B Hardware on patent law has not been resolved, but in general,
courts have been reluctant to apply it.19 Yet B & B Hardware presents an opportunity to apply issue preclusion law to the administrative patent context.
In doing so, courts can encourage consistency in interpretation of patent
scope and vindicate the exclusivity–disclosure bargain that a patent is meant
to strike.
This Note argues that claim construction by the PTAB—that is, administrative determinations of the scope of a given patent 20—should give rise to
issue preclusion, forming a preclusive outer bound of a patent’s scope. Part I
explains how adjudication within various Article I and Article III proceedings has created inconsistency in the scope of patent rights and notes the reluctance of district courts and ITC administrative judges to afford an issue
preclusive effect to PTAB decisions. Part II explores the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in B & B Hardware, in which the Court emphasized a functionalist, two-step approach to applying issue preclusion to the decisions of administrative bodies acting in an adjudicatory capacity. Part III applies this
“B & B Two-Step” inquiry to the inter partes review (IPR) proceeding created by the America Invents Act (AIA) and concludes that such preclusion is
consistent with the AIA. Part IV proposes an outer-bounds preclusion theory consistent with the policy goals underlying claim construction and faithful
to the differences underlying judicial and administrative determinations of
claim scope.
I.

Schrödinger’s Patent: How Can a Patent’s Meaning Change?

This Part describes the legal and structural causes of the “Schrödinger’s
patent” problem. Section I.A explores the role of claim construction in patent law. Section I.B highlights the policy considerations that underlie claim
construction and also notes the public reliance interest on patent scope determinations. Section I.C demonstrates how a patent may take on different
meanings in different legal settings, due in part to inconsistencies in the
weight district courts afford administrative claim construction decisions.
A. The Role of Claim Construction in Patent Law
In principle, a patent is a single document describing a single invention
with clarity, staking out the inventor’s claimed property rights. 21 This is a

17. 135 S. Ct. at 1293.
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
21. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012) (“The specification shall contain a written description
of the invention . . . in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in
the art . . . to make and use the same . . . .” (emphasis added)); § 112(b) (“The specification shall
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trade: an inventor makes public a clear and enabling disclosure of a new and
useful invention, and in exchange, the government grants a temporary right
to exclude others from practicing that invention. 22 Clarity is a virtue here.
Because patent infringement is a strict-liability offense, 23 it is sound policy
for the public to know ex ante whether a particular patent will be infringed
by a given technology. 24
In practice, clarity is difficult to achieve. 25 Language is fuzzy, even when
objective technical terms are employed. 26 Indeed, the inherent complexity of
technology, 27 the ambiguity of language, 28 the changing meanings of technical terms over time, 29 and various idiosyncrasies of patent law 30 all play a
synergistic role in this uncertainty. Thus, despite efforts by Congress and the

conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject
matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.” (emphasis added)).
22. See Sherkow, supra note 10, at 865–66 (discussing the disclosure “quid pro quo”);
see also Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944) (“As a reward for inventions and to encourage their disclosure, the United States offers a seventeen-year
monopoly . . . . But the quid pro quo is disclosure . . . in sufficient detail to enable one skilled in
the art to practice the invention . . . and the same precision of disclosure is likewise essential to
warn the industry concerned of the precise scope of the monopoly asserted.”).
23. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
24. See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014) (remarking that a patent must be clear enough to “appris[e] the public of what is still open to them,” so
as to avoid a “zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation may enter only at the
risk of infringement claims” (cleaned up)).
25. See, e.g., Haemonetics Corp. v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 607 F.3d 776, 783 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (“[C]laim construction frequently poses difficult questions over which reasonable minds
may disagree . . . .”).
26. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730–31
(2002) (“Unfortunately, the nature of language makes it impossible to capture the essence of a
thing in a patent application. . . . The language in the patent claims may not capture every nuance of the invention or describe with complete precision the range of its novelty.”).
27. See, e.g., Donna M. Gitter, Should the United States Designate Specialist Patent Trial
Judges? An Empirical Analysis of H.R. 628 in Light of the English Experience and the Work of
Professor Moore, 10 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 169, 174–82 (2009); Peter Lee, Patent Law
and the Two Cultures, 120 Yale L.J. 2, 9–17 (2010).
28. See, e.g., Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(“[I]t is not unusual for parties to offer competing definitions of even the simplest claim language.”).
29. See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104
Mich. L. Rev. 101 (2005) (exploring how courts approach patent claim interpretation when
words change over time).
30. For instance, patent law has its own conventions for the meaning of “a” or “an”
(sometimes meaning “one,” see, e.g., N. Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571,
1575–76 (Fed. Cir. 1993), and sometimes meaning “one or more,” see, e.g., Baldwin Graphic
Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) as well as “comprising,” see
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 133 (2012) (characterizing synonymy of
“comprise” and “include” as an “anomalous” feature of patent law).
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courts to improve clarity by legislation and judicial doctrine, ambiguity and
uncertainty persist. 31
Resolving the scope of a patent is essential to determining both infringement and validity. 32 Doing so determines which possible inventions
are or are not included within the language of a patent’s claims. 33 A claim is
overbroad when it comprises subject matter previously available to the public 34—that is, where the public does not receive its end of the disclosure bargain: a new and useful invention.
The legal process of determining what the words of a patent claim mean
is known as “claim construction” 35 and is in many ways analogous to statutory construction. 36 Claim construction determines the scope of the patent
right. In the litigation context, claim construction is adversarial and subject
to tensions even between alternative goals of the same party. 37 This querying
of the precise “metes and bounds” 38 of a utility patent frequently arises not
only in different actions but also in different jurisdictional settings. For instance, the same patent owner might sue various defendants for individual
instances of infringement. Or the same patent may appear in IPR proceedings before the PTAB to contest validity, Section 337 investigations before
the ITC to determine infringement by imported goods, or district court proceedings to resolve issues of infringement or validity.39
The question of a patent’s meaning is not only an ex post adjudicative
consideration, because the inventing public must also look to patent claims
to determine ex ante any risk of infringement. Somewhere between these ex
post and ex ante considerations is patent examination, where the Patent Of-

31. See generally Gary M. Fox, Note, Understanding Nautilus’s Reasonable-Certainty
Standard: Requirements for Linguistic and Physical Definiteness of Patent Claims, 116 Mich. L.
Rev. 329 (2017) (discussing the Supreme Court’s reinterpretation of the statutory definiteness
requirement for patent claims).
32. See generally 3-8 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 8.01 (2018) (discussing
patent claims and noting that patent claims serve the dual functions of “defin[ing] the invention for the purpose of applying the conditions of patentability” and “for the purpose of determining infringement”).
33. See id.
34. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
35. Or, alternatively, “claim interpretation.” E.g., 5-18A Chisum, supra note 32, § 18.01.
36. See generally 5-18A Chisum, supra note 32, §§ 18.01, 18.03 (discussing claim interpretation); Christian E. Mammen, Patent Claim Construction as a Form of Legal Interpretation,
12 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 40 (2012) (comparing patent interpretation and legal
interpretation).
37. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 7, at 2225 (describing problem of patent owners
arguing for inconsistent scope depending on the doctrinal context and cautioning that
“[w]ithout a single integrated scope proceeding, there is no easy way to constrain this behavior”).
38. See MPEP § 2173.02 (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018).
39. See Gugliuzza, supra note 5, at 278–87.
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fice looks at an application’s claims and determines their meaning as measured against already-known inventions, or “prior art.” 40
B. Policy Considerations Underlying Claim Construction
Certain policy considerations in claim construction emphasize the importance of clarity and uniformity in defining a patent’s scope. These include
the public notice function of patents and the desire for uniformity. There are
also equitable considerations. Third parties should be able to rely on prior
adjudications determining the boundaries of patent rights. It is also desirable
to prevent patent owners from molding their patents in real time based on
the current legal context.
The public notice function aims to warn potential infringers and the
public of the scope of a patent’s claims. 41 This not only enables commercializers to avoid liability but also marks the edge of protected patent space for
innovators, signaling the frontiers at which patentable innovation can be
pursued. Similarly, the normative goal of uniformity in patent interpretation
has been articulated in the case law 42 and in the literature. 43 The Supreme
Court has also emphasized the importance of clarity in the boundaries of patent rights—as with any property right. 44 Together, these goals vindicate the
fundamental exclusivity–disclosure trade in patent law. 45
Cognizant of this trade, the Court has emphasized the need for the public to know what is and what is not infringement, seeking to minimize any
risk-laden “zone of uncertainty.” 46 But the Court has also cautioned against
strict literalism. For instance, the “doctrine of equivalents” seeks to avoid
underprotection of patent rights. 47 This, however, lessens certainty ex ante. 48

40. See generally MPEP ch. 700 (providing procedure for examination of applications);
1-3 Chisum, supra note 32, § 3.01.
41. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (invoking public notice function and considerations of justice to the public in interpretation).
42. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) (“[W]e see the
importance of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent as an independent reason to allocate all issues of construction to the court.”).
43. Scholars have advocated for consistent interpretations of a patent’s scope across
time and across doctrines. See Lemley, supra note 29 (across time); Lemley & McKenna, supra
note 7 (across doctrines). This Note argues for consistent interpretations across branches of the
government.
44. E.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730
(2002) (emphasizing that a patent is “a property right; and like any property right, its boundaries should be clear”); Markman, 517 U.S. at 373 (“It has long been understood that a patent
must describe the exact scope of an invention and its manufacture . . . .”).
45. See Sherkow, supra note 10, at 865–66 (discussing this “quid pro quo”).
46. See supra note 24.
47. See Festo, 535 U.S. at 731–32 (“If patents were always interpreted by their literal
terms . . . . [u]nimportant and insubstantial substitutes for certain elements could defeat the
patent . . . .”).
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As a result, the public has a heightened reliance interest on legal decisions as
to patent scope49—especially decisions that are formally part of the patent’s
prosecution history. 50 Claim construction doctrine supports the public’s reliance interest—for instance, a patent’s prosecution history is accorded heavy
evidentiary weight by district courts.51
C. The Changing Meaning of a Single Patent in Various Settings
Despite these policy considerations, claim construction is not unified
between proceedings, and so neither is patent scope. Questions of patent
meaning arise in distinct adjudicatory bodies—namely, federal courts, the
PTAB, and the ITC. These bodies all oversee questions of patent scope, and
all patents in question are grounded in the same Patent Act. 52 Yet, as described below, each has a distinct set of procedural rules and a hesitation to
apply preclusion. Hence, “Schrödinger’s patent” may arise because of conflicting decisions. 53
Questions of patent meaning arise in various legal settings. Article III
courts hear disputes over patent infringement claims, patent invalidity counterclaims, and declaratory judgments of noninfringement or invalidity,
among others. Article I bodies adjudicate patent rights too. For instance,
Section 337 investigations before the ITC are accelerated inter partes proceedings in which the ITC determines whether imported articles infringe the
intellectual property rights of domestic parties (and whether such articles are
to be barred from import). 54 The ITC is governed by its own rules of proce-

48. See id. (“The scope of a patent is not limited to its literal terms but instead embraces
all equivalents to the claims described. It is true that the doctrine of equivalents renders the
scope of patents less certain.” (citation omitted)).
49. See Lauren Drake, Note, Preventing Inequity: Extending Issue Preclusion to Claim
Construction During Reexamination of Previously Litigated Patents, 44 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 749,
766 (2011) (“[The reliance] rationale extends to the public’s reliance on claim construction as
determined during a Markman hearing. In the same way that public policy is promoted
through the public’s ability to look only to non-disclaimed claims in the original patent to determine the patent’s scope, public policy is also promoted through the public’s ability to look at
a patent’s litigation history to determine the meaning of the patent’s claims.”).
50. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“The
claims, specification, and file history . . . constitute the public record of the patentee’s claim, a
record on which the public is entitled to rely.”).
51. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“The
prosecution history, which we have designated as part of the ‘intrinsic evidence,’ consists of the
complete record of the proceedings before the PTO . . . . [T]he prosecution history provides
evidence of how the PTO and the inventor understood the patent.” (citation omitted)).
52. The “Patent Act” generally refers to Title 35 of the U.S. Code.
53. See Gugliuzza, supra note 5, at 287–92 (describing the nature of conflicting decisions
between courts and the USPTO).
54. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012) (empowering the ITC to conduct Section 337 investigations).
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dure. 55 But these rules resemble the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in many
respects, 56 and the ITC is subject to the same Federal Circuit body of patent
law as any other tribunal. 57 Section 337 investigations before administrative
law judges are in many ways trial-like, requiring formal evidentiary hearings
and involving exceptionally high-stakes, expensive disputes. 58
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) also adjudicates some patent disputes. The most prominent of the USPTO’s adjudicative forms is IPR, an adversarial post-grant validity challenge procedure before the PTAB established by the AIA in 2012. 59 Under the AIA, a party may
petition the PTAB to institute an IPR; the party must establish that a patent
is more likely than not invalid on the grounds of either novelty or obviousness. 60 If the PTAB institutes the IPR, the patent owner and petitioner participate in an abbreviated but trial-like proceeding. 61 The PTAB ultimately
issues a “final written decision” on patentability, including claim construction when necessary. 62 Final decisions of the PTAB are appealable to the
Federal Circuit. 63 As with ITC Section 337 investigations, proceedings at the
PTAB follow a set of procedures that resemble the Federal Rules. 64
Because of the procedural and substantive similarities of district court,
ITC, and PTAB claim construction, issue preclusion would be aptly applied
between these settings. The commonality of the patent right, the prospect of
judicial efficiency, and the weight of the policy underpinnings of patent law

55. See Section 337 Rules, U.S. Int’l Trade Commission, https://www.usitc.gov/
intellectual_property/section_337_rules.htm [https://perma.cc/AT43-6KLR].
56. See William P. Atkins & Justin A. Pan, An Updated Primer on Procedures and Rules
in 337 Investigations at the U.S. International Trade Commission, 18 U. Balt. Intell. Prop.
L.J. 105, 112 (2010) (observing that “[a]n investigation resembles private litigation and the
Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure (Rules) are based on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure”).
57. See Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Understanding the Federal Circuit: An Expert Community Approach, 30 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 89, 98–104 (2015).
58. See generally Understanding Investigations of Intellectual Property Infringement and
Other Unfair Practices in Import Trade (Section 337), U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, https://www.
usitc.gov/press_room/us337.htm [https://perma.cc/6N64-4QQC].
59. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6(a), 125 Stat. 284, 299–305
(2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19 (2012)) (establishing inter partes review). Two similar
procedures—so-called post-grant review (PGR) and covered business method review (CBM)—
operate in largely the same way, with differences in timing, grounds to challenge a patent, challengeable subject matter, and standing. See Gugliuzza, supra note 5, at 281–85 (comparing and
contrasting these proceedings).
60. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012). IPR is limited to the body of prior art consisting of patents and written publications. Id.
61. See id. § 314(a).
62. Id. § 318(a).
63. Id. §§ 141(c), 319.
64. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 42.62(a) (2017) (adopting Federal Rules of Evidence as default
rules in PTAB proceedings).
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all should encourage these bodies to share claim construction determinations. Moreover, the doctrine of issue preclusion is a way the law generally
endeavors to provide consistency between judgments, especially regarding
property, 65 and courts have applied the doctrine to each others’ claim construction decisions where appropriate. 66 Such preclusion should be expanded to include the PTAB and ITC. 67
Yet actual practice varies. For instance, district courts have no clear rule
for claim construction following a proceeding at the PTAB for deference or
for issue preclusion. Some courts give PTAB claim construction decisions
“reasoned deference.” 68 District courts sometimes use PTAB interpretations
when doing so would “simplify the claim construction issues” 69 or would
provide guidance. 70 Other courts use PTAB claim construction decisions
merely for “comfort.” 71 But some district courts consider PTAB claim construction to be extrinsic evidence entitled to no deference at all. 72 The Federal Circuit has suggested in dicta that PTAB claim construction decisions do
not satisfy the ordinary elements of issue preclusion. 73 But in practice, at

65. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
66. E.g., In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
67. This Note contends that issue preclusion as to claim construction would be appropriate. Preclusion as to patent validity is a separate question, and scholars such as Professor
Paul Gugliuzza have generally cautioned against such preclusion because of the varying legal
standards and burdens of proof on the issue of validity. See Gugliuzza, supra note 5, at 289.
Even so, despite a separate burden of proof, success in an effort at invalidation at the PTAB or
in district court results in the same legal outcome: invalidation of the patent. One cannot assert
a PTAB-cancelled patent (if such cancellation is affirmed on appeal) in a later district court
action. Gugliuzza responds by noting that in such cases, it is the certificate of cancellation (removing a patent owner’s standing), not the doctrine of issue preclusion, that bars the later action. Id. at 312.
68. See, e.g., Contentguard Holdings, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., Nos. 2:13-CV-1112JRG, 2:14-CV-61-JRG, 2015 WL 8073722, at *11 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2015) (“On balance, Plaintiff has failed to justify departing from the PTAB’s construction, which is entitled to ‘reasoned
deference.’ ” (quoting Maurice Mitchell Innovations, L.P. v. Intel Corp., No. 2:04-CV-450,
2006 WL 1751779, at *4 (E.D. Tex. June 21, 2006)).
69. See, e.g., MASA LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 4:15-CV-00889-AGF, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
60953, at *7–8 (E.D. Mo. May 9, 2016); Ericsson Inc. v. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd.,
No. 2:15-cv-00011-RSP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37502, at *13–14 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 23, 2016).
70. See, e.g., BTG Int’l Ltd. v. Actavis Labs. FI, Inc., No. 15-cv-5909 (KM)(JBC), 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157586, at *39 (D.N.J. Nov. 10, 2016) (noting that an IPR decision adopting a
party’s claim construction “would be relevant, but not dispositive”).
71. E.g., Memory Integrity, LLC v. Intel Corp., No. 3:15-cv-00262-SI, 2016 WL 1122718,
at *16 n.9 (D. Or. Mar. 22, 2016) (“This Court uses the PTAB decision on this issue not for
guidance, but for comfort.”).
72. E.g., Pragmatus AV, LLC v. Yahoo! Inc., No. C-13-1176 EMC, 2014 WL 1922081, at
*4 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2014) (“[T]his Court owes no deference to the PTAB’s claim construction done as part of an inter partes review.”); Depuy Orthopaedics, Inc. v. Orthopaedic Hosp.,
No. 3:12-CV-299-CAN, 2016 WL 96164, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 8, 2016) (same).
73. See SkyHawke Techs., LLC v. DECA Int’l Corp., 828 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
2016); see also Rembrandt Wireless Techs., LP v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 853 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed.
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least one district court has applied issue preclusion, finding that the ordinary
elements of issue preclusion are met with respect to IPRs. 74 Nevertheless,
other courts have found that issue preclusion cannot apply. 75
Concurrent proceedings in district courts and the PTAB are another example of when claim construction judgments provide uncertain issue preclusive effects. 76 The PTAB may invalidate a patent during the pendency of a
district court case, yet the district court may forge ahead and submit the
question of infringement to the jury anyway. 77 District courts often stay their
proceedings pending resolution of a PTAB proceeding, but they are under
no obligation to do so, and the PTAB cannot stay its own proceeding. 78
What is the result of this inconsistency? Schrödinger’s patent. For example, in Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp., a district court considered a question of patent infringement despite the defendant’s prior invalidation of the patent in an IPR. 79 There, the court interpreted a separate
statutory estoppel provision to prevent the patent challenger from raising
any ground that could have been raised in the IPR. 80 The lack of issue preclusion and the presence of the statutory estoppel provision essentially
meant that a patent challenger could lose in district court precisely because
they brought an action at the PTAB, despite winning there. 81 In another example, the ITC found infringement of a patent based on claims that had

Cir. 2017) (noting that broader PTAB claim construction did not bind court but that issue was
immaterial, as it would not have changed outcome)
74. See Princeton Dig. Image Corp. v. Konami Dig. Entm’t, Inc., Nos. 12-1461-LPS-CJB,
13-335-LPS-CJB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92894, at *9–10 (D. Del. June 16, 2017).
75. See, e.g., Illumina, Inc. v. Qiagen, N.V., 207 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
76. See Gugliuzza, supra note 5, at 292–305.
77. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp., 221 F. Supp. 3d 534, 553–54
(D. Del. 2016) (applying statutory estoppel against party that had successfully invalidated patent at the PTAB).
78. See Gugliuzza, supra note 5, at 273, 285–86 (observing that “[a]cross all postissuance proceedings, district courts grant motions seeking stays of litigation roughly sixty percent of the time”).
79. 221 F. Supp. 3d at 553–54, 559 (also denying a stay).
80. Intellectual Ventures I, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 553–54, 559; see also 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2)
(2012) (“The petitioner in an inter partes review . . . that results in a final written decision . . .
may not assert . . . in a civil action . . . that the claim is invalid on any ground that the petitioner
raised or reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review.”).
81. See also Certain Hybrid Electric Vehicles and Components Thereof, USITC Inv. No.
337-TA-1042, at 1 (Nov. 8, 2017) (Respondent Ford’s Petition for Review of Order No. 30 on
Complainant’s Motion for Summary Determination of Estoppel). In Certain Hybrid Electric
Vehicles, complainant brought its ITC complaint after the PTAB finding of invalidity in an
IPR. See id.
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been concurrently found unpatentable by the PTAB in an IPR; the ITC refused to lift its exclusion order on the basis of the IPR decision. 82
Patent scope, as a key aspect of a novelty or obviousness determination,
can be determinative of patent validity. 83 Thus, inconsistent scope means inconsistent validity. A reluctance to apply issue preclusion to administrative
decisions may frustrate not only the consistency goals of the doctrine but also those of the patent system generally.
II.

Administrative Issue Preclusion:
The B & B Hardware Two-Step

This Part explores the doctrine of administrative issue preclusion. Section II.A introduces the Court’s jurisprudence on the grounding of issue
preclusion in administrative decisions, as most recently expressed in B & B
Hardware. Section II.B examines the reasoning underlying B & B Hardware
and argues that the Court has adopted a functionalist two-step inquiry.
Then, in the context of the same case, Section II.C examines the Court’s application of ordinary issue preclusion law, focusing in particular on how the
Court evaluates the identity of legal issues and materiality of procedural differences.
A. Administrative Issue Preclusion and the B & B Two-Step
In 2015, the Supreme Court reemphasized in B & B Hardware that administrative bodies acting in a judicial capacity presumptively give rise to issue preclusion if the ordinary elements of issue preclusion are satisfied.84 The
Court formulated a two-part test, asking first whether there is an evident
reason why Congress would not want particular administrative decisions to
receive preclusive effect (B & B Step One) and second whether the ordinary
elements of issue preclusion are met (B & B Step Two).
B & B Hardware was not the only time federal courts have found that
administrative decisions can trigger issue preclusion. 85 It is, however, the
strongest articulation of the principle that unless expressly disclaimed, Congress “presumptively intends that an agency’s determination . . . has preclusive effect.” 86 The Court has adopted the elements and underlying law of is82. Certain Network Devices, Related Software and Components Thereof (II), USITC
Inv. No. 337-TA-945 (July 20, 2017) (Notice of Commission Determination to Deny Respondent’s Petitions to Suspend or Temporarily Rescind Remedial Orders).
83. See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007) (considering, with
respect to patent validity, “the content of the prior art, the scope of the patent claim, and the
level of ordinary skill in the art”).
84. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1302–03 (2015).
85. E.g., Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 798 (1986); United States v. Utah Constr.
& Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 421–22 (1966). See generally 18B Charles Alan Wright et al.,
Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction and Related Matters § 4475 (2d ed.),
Westlaw (database updated April 2017).
86. B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1304–05.
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sue preclusion from the Restatement of Judgments. 87 Thus, aside from certain exceptions, “[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to
the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.” 88
In B & B Hardware, Hargis Industries sought to register a trademark but
ran into trouble when B & B Hardware filed an opposition proceeding before
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), alleging a likelihood of confusion with its own trademark. 89 The TTAB found Hargis’s trademark likely
to cause confusion with that of B & B Hardware, and Hargis did not appeal
the TTAB decision, despite availability of judicial review.90 B & B Hardware’s
opposition proceeding was concurrent with a district court infringement action between the same parties, and B & B Hardware argued that Hargis was
precluded in the district court from contesting likelihood of confusion as a
matter of issue preclusion. 91 Below, the Eighth Circuit held that differences
between the two proceedings (especially legal standards and procedure)
made issue preclusion inappropriate. 92 The Supreme Court disagreed.
B. The Court’s Reasoning Underlying the B & B Two-Step
The Court’s reasoning underlying this question can be divided into two
parts: (1) can an agency’s decisions ever provide a basis for issue preclusion?
(“B & B Step One”); and, if so, (2) when can an agency’s decision provide
such a basis? (“B & B Step Two”).
In establishing B & B Step One, the Court first asked whether an agency
decision could ever ground issue preclusion. 93 The Court articulated a broad
policy goal of preventing relitigation and conserving time and resources, 94
emphasizing that “a losing litigant deserves no rematch after a defeat fairly
suffered.” 95 The majority also acknowledged case law indicating that “where

87. Id. at 1303.
88. Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (Am. Law Inst. 1982)
(alteration in original)).
89. Id. at 1299. The USPTO, under the Lanham Act, provides for an opposition proceeding before the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board (TTAB) wherein the pending registration
of a trademark may be challenged. See generally TMEP § 1503 (Oct. 2017).
90. B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1302.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1298–99 (“Allowing the same issue to be decided more than once wastes litigants’ resources and adjudicators’ time, and it encourages parties who lose before one tribunal
to shop around for another. The doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion is designed
to prevent this from occurring.”); see also id. at 1302–03.
95. Id. at 1302–03 (quoting Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104,
107 (1991)).
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a single issue is before a court and an administrative agency, preclusion . . . often applies.”96 Because issue preclusion was such a “well established” principle at common law, the Court reiterated, courts may “take it as
given” that when Congress has authorized agencies to resolve disputes, it
“legislated with the expectation that the principle . . . will apply except when
a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.” 97 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court articulated a baseline presumption that issue preclusion applies to the
decisions of administrative bodies authorized to resolve disputes unless
Congress clearly articulated otherwise. 98
Next, B & B Step Two. The Court asked “whether there is a categorical
reason why [particular administrative] decisions can never meet the ordinary elements of issue preclusion.”99 The Court emphasized that this inquiry
is not defeated by the fact that sometimes the elements will not be met—it is
aimed at whether they can never be. 100 Thus, preclusion may apply in the
administrative context if the ordinary elements of issue preclusion can be
met. 101 That is not to say that issue preclusion will always apply to the administrative decisions in question, but that is also true of judicial decisions.
C. The Court’s Application of the Two-Step in B & B Hardware
Applying B & B Step One (“statutory purpose to the contrary”), the
Court examined the Lanham Act to discern whether there was “an ‘evident’
reason why Congress would not want TTAB decisions to receive preclusive
effect, even in those cases in which the ordinary elements of issue preclusion
are met.” 102 The Court found no such reason, noting that neither the Lanham Act’s text nor structure “forbid issue preclusion.” 103 Likewise, the Court
noted that judicial review of TTAB decisions is provided for and underscored the point that a party who chooses not to appeal is subject to preclusion, even if the conclusion would have been reviewed de novo. 104 Turning
to B & B Step Two, the court found no categorical reason why the “ordinary
elements” of issue preclusion could never be met at the TTAB. 105 The Eighth
Circuit had held that there could never be identity of the issues 106 between
96. Id. at 1303.
97. Id. (quoting Astoria v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991)).
98. Id. at 1302–05. This is referred to here as the “statutory purpose to the contrary”
test, or B & B Step One.
99. Id. at 1306–10. That is, the elements set out in the Restatement. Id.
100. Id. (“Although many registrations will not satisfy those ordinary elements, that does
not mean that none will.”).
101. This question is referred to here as the “ordinary elements” test, or B & B Step Two.
102. B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1305.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1306.
106. Identity of the issues is sometimes treated as a subsidiary consideration of the first
element of preclusion from the Restatement (issue actually litigated), as in B & B Hardware,
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the TTAB and district courts because of different factors in assessing likelihood of confusion. 107 The Court disagreed. In differentiating between legal
standards and underlying factors, the Court acknowledged that issues “are
not identical if the second action involves application of a different legal
standard, even though the factual setting of both suits may be the same.”108
But the Court also found that facially different issues, even with different
statutory bases and underlying factors or tests, 109 might be “in essence” the
same legal standard. 110 Looking to the factors underlying the TTAB and the
Eight Circuit tests, the Court concluded that they were “not fundamentally
different.” 111
By emphasizing the “essence” of the underlying legal standards, the
Court appears to have articulated a policy grounded more in functionalism
than strict formalism, apparently concerned that technical differences in the
wording of statutes might allow a party to practice “the very evils that issue
preclusion helps to prevent.” 112 In looking at whether the two legal standards
were the same, the Court considered “the operative language,” the historical
basis of each standard, and whether both tribunals apply the standards to
achieve the same result. 113 Rejecting the argument that the scope of the
marks being compared typically differed, the Court declared that “a reason
not to apply issue preclusion in some or even many cases” is not “a reason
never to apply issue preclusion.” 114
The Court also considered procedural differences between TTAB and
district courts: namely, an absence of live testimony and narrower discovery. 115 The Court held that this did not constitute a categorical reason why
the “ordinary elements” should never be satisfied. 116 And even in individual

but it is sometimes treated as a separate element, e.g., In re Trans Tex. Holdings Corp., 498
F.3d 1290, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
107. B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1306.
108. Id. (quoting 18 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 4417, at 449 (2d ed. 2002)).
109. See generally Jane C. Ginsburg et al., Trademark and Unfair Competition
Law 255 (6th ed. 2017) (comparing likelihood of confusion in TTAB (i.e., registration) and
district court (i.e., infringement) contexts).
110. B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1306–07.
111. Id. at 1307.
112. Id. (“More important, if federal law provides a single standard, parties cannot escape
preclusion simply by litigating anew in tribunals that apply that one standard differently.”).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1308.
115. Id. at 1309. The Court further noted that “the agency’s procedures[ are in] large
part . . . exactly the same as in federal court. For instance, although the scope of discovery in
Board proceedings is generally narrower than in court proceedings—reflecting the fact that
there are often fewer usages at issue—the TTAB has adopted almost the whole of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26.” Id. (cleaned up).
116. Id.
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hypothetical instances where procedural differences might be material, the
exceptions of ordinary preclusion law could provide an equitable safety
valve. 117
Thus, the Supreme Court in B & B Hardware formulated a two-part test
for whether administrative bodies acting in a quasi-judicial capacity may
ground issue preclusion. The test is remarkably inclusive, relying on a strong
default presumption of preclusion based on functionalist considerations but
fine-tuned by the equitable safety valves of ordinary preclusion law. But in
the few years since the Court’s decision, B & B Hardware has not yet seen
broad application outside the trademark context. As the next Part explores,
however, extension to the patent context is especially appropriate.
III. Applying the B & B Two-Step to Claim Construction in
Inter Partes Review
This Part applies the B & B Hardware Two-Step to the administrative
patent claim construction context. Can PTAB claim construction decisions
in an IPR proceeding ground issue preclusion? The question is twofold.
First, Section III.A considers whether Congress intended PTAB decisions not
to have preclusive effect and finds no “statutory purpose to the contrary.”
Second, Section III.B examines in which situations (if any) PTAB claim construction decisions might satisfy the elements of issue preclusion. Although
Congress does not seem to have indicated that preclusion should categorically not apply, some aspects of IPR point to the need for a specially tailored solution.
A. B & B Step One: No Statutory Purpose to the Contrary
Through the lens of B & B Step One, the statutory context and policy
considerations underlying the IPR process indicate no “statutory purpose to
the contrary” regarding issue preclusion.
What can be discerned from the text and structure of the AIA? 118 First,
the AIA affirmatively grants the PTAB authority to cancel an already-issued
patent. 119 Second, it grants the USPTO authority to set the legal standards
through promulgation of regulations. 120 Congress structurally limited the
ability of courts to relitigate IPR issues. Congress also explicitly provided for
judicial review of PTAB decisions by the Federal Circuit, but not district

117. See id. The exceptions to the general rule of issue preclusion appear in the Restatement and include, for instance, unavailability of review of the first judgment, the need for a
new determination of law in light of an intervening change in context, differences in quality or
extensiveness of procedures, serious differences in the burden of persuasion, and considerations of public interest. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 (Am. Law Inst. 1982).
118. Cf. B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1302–06 (examining text and structure of Lanham
Act).
119. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319 (2012).
120. Id. § 316(a).
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courts. 121 In addition to limiting the pathways for review of final decisions,
the AIA withdraws from judicial review the PTAB’s decisions to institute
IPRs at all. 122 On the whole, this illustrates a structure designed by Congress
to limit judicial oversight and bolster the competence of the PTAB. Although
this does not explicitly endorse issue preclusion, it is far from a “statutory
purpose of the contrary.”
The AIA affirmatively provides for some preclusion, establishing that a
petitioner may not assert in a civil action or ITC investigation “any ground
that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised” during the IPR. 123
Essentially, this has the effect of preventing a challenger from repeating the
same arguments in a later action. The significance of the statutory reference
estoppel provisions might be read in several ways. Under a permissive reading, one could view them as a signal of Congress’s affirmative conferral of
general competence regarding preclusion upon the PTAB. A neutral reading
might view them as simply a choice-of-forum provision. But a restrictive
reading might view them as an enumeration of the only kinds of preclusion
permitted. 124 Indeed, statutory reference estoppel has been construed to be
narrow in scope, 125 and there is a strong presumption in favor of judicial review. 126 Thus, this jurisprudence might caution against the expansion of preclusion beyond that enumerated. 127 The presumption that Congress intends
preclusion “absent a contrary indication,” 128 however, suggests a propreclusion reading. That is, Congress does not need to explicitly endorse
administrative estoppel if it has not forbidden it.
Additional considerations support the competence of PTAB decisions to
have preclusive effect. First, as a matter of legislative purpose, IPR was in-

121. Id. §§ 141(c), 319.
122. Id. § 314(d).
123. Id. § 315(e)(2). For the purpose of this Note, this will be referred to as “statutory
reference estoppel.” This is because § 315(e)(2) operates with respect to a combination of a
particular statutory ground (i.e., novelty or obviousness) and particular prior art references
(i.e., a particular set of patents and printed publications). See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC
v. Toshiba Corp., 221 F. Supp. 3d 534, 554 (D. Del. 2016) (estopping challenger, on § 315(e)(2)
grounds, from raising obviousness based on three specific prior art patents).
124. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 30, at 107–11 (expressio unius).
125. For instance, because of AIA text limiting statutory reference estoppel to grounds
that could have been raised “during” IPR, statutory reference estoppel does not apply to an
invalidity ground included in an IPR petition but not instituted. Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2016); HP Inc. v. MPHJ Tech. Invs.,
LLC, 817 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
126. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016).
127. Some courts have pushed back against this, hesitant to give a “second bite at the apple.” E.g., Parallel Networks Licensing, LLC v. IBM, No. 13-2072 (KAJ), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
28461, at *30 (D. Del. Feb. 22, 2017).
128. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1302–03 (2015).
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tended to be an alternative to litigation. 129 If relitigation of the same issues is
permitted in both an IPR and district court context, the actions are duplicative, not alternative. 130 Of course, the argument could be made that the claim
construction issue is not the same, but as discussed later, this does not foreclose preclusion; it simply changes its character. 131 Second, the PTAB is also
of technical competence, which is important to resolving the meaning of
claim terms. Indeed, deference to agencies is most appropriate within their
area of expertise—especially when it comes to technical matters132—and administrative issue preclusion doctrine considers regulatory context.133 The
USPTO has special expertise in “resolving patent claims” 134 and has the
“primary responsibility for sifting out unpatentable material.” 135 IPR proceedings are presided over by administrative patent judges who resemble an
intermediate between technically qualified patent examiners and legally
qualified judges. 136
Two policy considerations underlying patent law also support issue preclusion: the public notice function of patents and the desire for uniformity.
The notice function aims to warn potential infringers and the public of the
scope of the patent’s claims. 137 This supports the conclusiveness of PTAB determinations, such that a potentially infringing practitioner may rely on all
proper adjudications of a patent’s meaning. The very fact that claim construction consists of questions of law and not questions for the jury also reflects a fundamental concern for uniformity in patent interpretation. 138 As a
doctrine, issue preclusion generally furthers uniformity by reducing the
number of conflicting alternative judgments on a given issue. 139
The close integration of the USPTO’s administrative authority and patent rights has also led to two judicial estoppel doctrines—prosecution histo-

129. E.g., Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“With its enactment of the AIA in 2011, Congress created IPRs to provide ‘quick and cost effective alternatives to litigation.’ ” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 48 (2011))).
130. See, e.g., ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 790 F.3d 1307, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(Moore, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (“Congress intended the
IPR/CBM/reexam route to be an alternative to district court litigation of certain validity issues,
not duplicative of them.”).
131. See infra Section III.B.3.
132. E.g., Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983).
133. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 29, 83(4) (Am. Law Inst. 1982).
134. E.g., Magna Donnelly Corp. v. Pilkington N. Am., Inc., No. 4:06-CV-126, 2007 WL
772891, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 12, 2007).
135. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966).
136. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012).
137. See supra note 41.
138. See supra note 42.
139. See generally Monica Renee Brownewell, Note, Rethinking the Restatement View
(Again!): Multiple Independent Holdings and the Doctrine of Issue Preclusion, 37 Val. U. L.
Rev. 879, 920 (2003) (observing that “collateral estoppel, as a procedural rule, seeks to create
uniformity in judgments”).
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ry estoppel 140 and prosecution disclaimer. 141 The doctrines limit the scope of
a patent’s claims based on statements made by a patent applicant to secure
the patent’s allowance. This implies that organs of the USPTO, including the
PTAB, are generally competent to preclude. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has
applied prosecution disclaimer against a patent owner on the basis of statements made during an IPR, 142 invoking the public notice function of patents. 143
This administrative context, however, also highlights a possible strike
against issue preclusion based on the materiality of a distinction between patent litigation and patent prosecution. Some courts have applied such a prosecution disclaimer because they regard IPR as part of patent prosecution. 144
Indeed, a patent claim may (theoretically) be amended during an IPR, 145 the
same legal standards are used as are during patent examination, 146 and the
proceeding occurs under the ambit of the USPTO. If an IPR is formally patent prosecution, then is the PTAB truly “acting in a judicial capacity” as
contemplated under B & B Hardware?147 Is that more akin to legislative ex
ante rulemaking than ex post administrative adjudication? 148 The Federal
Circuit seems to view IPR somewhere in the middle, a creature that has
characteristics of both prosecution and litigation, 149 but the Supreme Court

140. See generally Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,
733–35 (2002) (discussing prosecution history estoppel).
141. See generally Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Shire Pharm., Inc., 839 F.3d 1111, 1119 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (defining prosecution disclaimer).
142. Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 856 F.3d 1353, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding
that statements made by patent owner during IPR can be relied on to support finding of prosecution disclaimer during claim construction).
143. Id. at 1360 (“Extending the prosecution disclaimer doctrine to IPR proceedings will
ensure that claims are not argued one way in order to maintain their patentability and in a different way against accused infringers.”).
144. See id. Patent “prosecution” refers to the administrative process by which a patent
application is filed at and examined by the USPTO and is essentially “a series of negotiations
between the examiner and the inventor.” See generally Robert Patrick Merges & John Fitzgerald Duffy, Patent Law and Policy 58–62 (7th ed. 2017).
145. It could be argued that the ability to amend is essentially illusory, such motions almost never being granted. See Gugliuzza, supra note 5, at 284 n.87 (noting that PTAB only
granted six motions to amend in three-and-a-half years). Recent Federal Circuit case law, however, suggests a trajectory toward a patent owner’s ability to more readily amend claims during
an IPR. See, e.g., Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (allocating
burden of proof of unpatentability of amended claims in IPR to petitioner).
146. Examination also uses the BRI standard. See MPEP § 2111 (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017,
Jan. 2018).
147. See B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc. 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1303 (2015).
148. See Wright et al., supra note 85, § 4475 (discussing balance of adjudicatory and
legislative elements in administrative proceedings with respect to preclusion).
149. Compare Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 856 F.3d 1353, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(“[S]tatements made by a patent owner during an IPR proceeding . . . can be considered for
claim construction and relied upon to support a finding of prosecution disclaimer.”), with PPC
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has recently noted that IPR is adjudicative. 150 Indeed, the fact that revocation
of a patent right is at stake points to an adjudicative purpose of claim construction. Additionally, the existence of the two judicial estoppel doctrines
seems to suggest that the prosecution–litigation distinction is not material.
Thus, the structure and text of the AIA do not indicate a “statutory purpose to the contrary.” And although an IPR shares some characteristics of
patent examination, it bears more structural features in common with an adversarial quasi-judicial proceeding. Moreover, the PTAB, as an arm of the
technically qualified USPTO, is uniquely capable to make findings on the
technical meaning of a patent’s claims. Policy considerations—particularly,
the public notice doctrine and uniformity—similarly support the application
of issue preclusion to claim construction specifically. Although there is clearly no explicit endorsement by Congress, in the absence of a clear disapproval,
it is reasonable to go with the default under B & B Step One in favor of administrative preclusion.
B. B & B Step Two: Ordinary Elements Could Be Satisfied
B & B Step Two asks whether the Restatement’s “ordinary elements” of
issue preclusion are satisfied. The elements include whether (1) ”an issue of
fact or law is actually litigated” (including identity of the issues); (2) that issue is “determined by a valid and final judgment;” and (3) ”the determination is essential to the judgment.” 151 These ordinary elements must then be
balanced against any equitable exceptions to issue preclusion that arise. 152
Application of B & B Step Two reveals that the “ordinary elements” test will
often be largely satisfied due to the similarity between PTAB and judicial
claim construction. Indeed, only the doctrinal difference in legal standards
between claim constructions in district courts and IPRs is a potentially significant barrier.
1.

General Application of the “Ordinary Elements” Test

To begin, whether a claim construction is “actually litigated” in an IPR is
seemingly straightforward: was a claim construction determination made? If

Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc’ns RF, LLC, 815 F.3d 747, 756 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(“IPRs . . . are litigation-like contested proceedings before the Board.”).
150. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1353–54 (2018) (observing that IPR
“looks a good deal more like civil litigation,” including “many of the usual trappings”); Oil
States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1378 (2018) (noting
that although IPR is not an exercise of the judicial power, it “includes some of the features of
adversarial litigation”); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2146 (2016) (describing IPR and the district court as alternative fora for “review and adjudication of patent
claims”).
151. B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1303 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 27, 28 (Am. Law Inst. 1982)).
152. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28. Such equitable exceptions might
include the materiality of procedural differences in the two settings, for instance.
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so, the issue of claim construction was litigated. Indeed, claim construction
is required in a petitioner’s brief before the PTAB, a patent owner has the
opportunity to supply its own claim construction arguments, and the PTAB
decides claim construction in its final written decision. 153 Two exceptions do
arise. First, the PTAB may decide a claim term does not actually need construction and declare that it takes its “plain and ordinary meaning.” 154 In
such a case, the parties would be free in a subsequent proceeding to litigate a
precise construction. Second, because certain grounds of invalidity cannot be
asserted in an IPR (e.g., indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112), certain claim
construction arguments cannot actually be advanced in an IPR. 155 This does
not affect issue preclusion against patent owners, but it does caution against
its application against petitioners in certain cases. Importantly, however, differences in legal standards can nullify this first element, as discussed below
in Section III.B.3. 156
Because final validity or infringement judgments in patent litigation rest
on claim construction, claim construction determinations can frequently be
essential for preclusion purposes. 157 Determination of essentiality of claim
constructions to the final judgment is seemingly no different before the
PTAB than across subsequent district court actions. 158

153. 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) (2017) (requiring that petition propose claim construction);
see also id. § 41.120 (allowing for patent owner response); id. § 42.100(b) (requiring claims be
given their broadest reasonable construction).
154. See Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,764 (Aug. 14, 2012)
(“Regarding the need for a claim construction, where appropriate, it may be sufficient for a
party to provide a simple statement that the claim terms are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation . . . .”).
155. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012) (establishing that a petitioner in an inter partes review
may challenge a claim of a patent only on the basis of novelty under § 102 or obviousness under § 103). For instance, the PTAB cannot find a claim indefinite under § 112 during an IPR.
Merges & Duffy, supra note 144, at 310. This should not preclude a later court from seeking
an interpretation broader than the IPR’s claim construction if a § 112 invalidity argument is
advanced in a later proceeding.
156. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, cmt. c (discussing evaluation of
the dimensions of an issue). This identity-of-the-issues requirement is often formulated separately. See, e.g., In re Trans Tex. Holdings Corp., 498 F.3d 1290, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting
that issue preclusion requires “(1) identity of the issues in a prior proceeding; (2) the issues
were actually litigated; (3) the determination of the issues was necessary to the resulting judgment; and, (4) the party defending against preclusion had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issues” (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)).
157. See, e.g., Hemphill v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 85 F. App’x 765, 767 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(applying issue preclusion to claim construction where the “record show[ed] that the district
court’s determination of the meaning of identical terms in the earlier case was essential to the
judgment in that case”); cf. RF Del., Inc. v. Pac. Keystone Techs., Inc., 326 F.3d 1255, 1261
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that claim construction issued in interlocutory order was not sufficiently final to permit issue preclusion).
158. See generally Matthew A. Ferry, Different Infringement, Different Issue: Altering Issue
Preclusion as Applied to Claim Construction, 19 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 361, 375–77 (2011)
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Judgments are generally “valid and final” for issue preclusion purposes
when they constitute a deliberated, nontentative decision of an issue, even
prior to any appeal. 159 Determining whether an IPR decision constitutes a
“valid and final judgment” requires a more careful analysis given the unique
statutory context of IPR proceedings. At the conclusion of an IPR, the PTAB
first issues a “final written decision” on patentability of the claims for which
review was instituted. 160 The final written decision may be appealed to the
Federal Circuit. 161 If an appeal is not successful (or does not happen), the
USPTO issues a certificate of cancellation of the challenged claims, removing
a patent owner’s standing to sue. 162
Procedurally, a “final written determination” by the PTAB is probably
“final” for preclusion purposes. 163 A PTAB written decision is “final” in that
a successfully challenged claim will be cancelled if a patent owner loses and
fails to appeal to the Federal Circuit (or does appeal but loses there). 164 And
even if an appeal is pending, the norm in federal courts is that judgments are
generally immediately effective for preclusion purposes notwithstanding an
appeal. 165 The Supreme Court has seemingly suggested a baseline presumption that “ordinary preclusion law” is imported nearly wholesale into the
administrative context.166 One procedural facet of IPR, however, suggests
that this norm might not apply in this particular context: whereas patent invalidity arising from district courts is effective immediately upon a judgment
(requiring no action by the USPTO), a successful IPR results in a cancellation certificate only after resolution of any appeal. 167 In the reexamination
procedure that IPR replaced, finality for statutory reference estoppel did not
occur until exhaustion of an appeal. 168 But the plain text of the AIA suggests
that statutory reference estoppel attaches as of the “final written decision”
(reviewing concept of essentiality of claim construction in district court issue preclusion context).
159. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 & cmt. g (“[T]he court should determine that the decision . . . was adequately deliberated and firm, even if not final in the sense
of forming a basis for a judgment already entered.”).
160. 35 U.S.C. § 318(a).
161. Id. §§ 141(c), 319.
162. Id. § 318(b).
163. Cf. Dana v. E.S. Originals, Inc., 342 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he finality
requirement is less stringent for issue preclusion than for claim preclusion.” (quoting Christo
v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1339 (11th Cir. 2000))); Restatement (Second) of Judgments
§ 13 cmt. g (“The test of finality . . . is whether the conclusion in question is procedurally definite . . . .”).
164. See 35 U.S.C. § 318(b).
165. See, e.g., Dana, 342 F.3d at 1323; Rice v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 998 F.2d 997, 999
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (“The law is well settled that the pendency of an appeal has no effect on the
finality or binding effect of a trial court’s holding.”); SSIH Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 718 F.2d 365, 370 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
166. See B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1302–06 (2015).
167. See 35 U.S.C. § 318(b).
168. See Bettcher Indus., Inc. v. Bunzl USA, Inc., 661 F.3d 629, 642–43 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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before appeal. 169 Thus, the certificate, which also confirms patentable claims
and any amendments, may represent the point of finality or may simply represent administrative bookkeeping. 170 Indeed, a curious result emerges if the
PTAB’s decision results in statutory reference estoppel 171 but does not result
in issue preclusion. A successful petitioner is estopped from challenging a patent in a parallel litigation; until an appeal is resolved, the defeated patent
owner may continue to assert the patent, safe from any assault on the
grounds already used to invalidate it before the PTAB.172 Accordingly, in the
interests of uniformity, finality should attach as of the final written decision.
2.

Differences in Procedure Do Not Warrant a
Categorical Exception to Preclusion

Even when an issue has been “actually litigated,” ordinary preclusion law
provides an exception upon a showing of material procedural differences.173
This highlights one seemingly significant objection to affording preclusive
effect to IPR decisions: in some respects, the procedures are quite different.
For instance, district court case schedules are much longer—usually by a few
years—than an IPR, which must be completed within twelve months of institution. 174 IPR proceedings lack the summary judgment procedures and settlement options available in district courts. 175 The array of legal grounds of

169. Reading the PTAB final-decision statute, 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) (“If an inter partes review is instituted . . . the [PTAB] shall issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged . . . .” (emphasis added)), in conjunction with the reference estoppel statute, id. § 315(e)(2) (“The petitioner in an inter partes review . . . that results in
a final written decision under section 318(a) . . . may not assert . . . in a civil action . . . that the
claim is invalid on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during
that inter partes review.” (emphasis added)), strongly suggests this result under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 30, at 170–73 (presumption
of common usage). Overall, courts remain split on when exactly finality attaches to PTAB decisions in an IPR for statutory reference estoppel purposes. See Merck & Cie v. Gnosis S.P.A.,
808 F.3d 829, 840 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Ignite USA, LLC v. Pac. Mkt. Int’l, LLC, No. 14 C 856, 2014
WL 2505166, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 2014). But see Va. Innovation Scis., Inc. v. Samsung Elecs.
Co., 983 F. Supp. 2d 713, 752–53 (E.D. Va. 2014), vacated on other grounds, 614 F. App’x 503
(Fed. Cir. 2015).
170. See 35 U.S.C. § 318(b).
171. See supra note 123.
172. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text.
173. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(3) (Am. Law Inst. 1982) (noting that
preclusion is inappropriate where “[a] new determination of the issue is warranted by differences in the quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed in the two courts”).
174. See Michael J. Flibbert & Maureen D. Queler, 5 Distinctions Between IPRs and District Court Patent Litigation, Finnegan (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.finnegan.com/en/
insights/5-distinctions-between-iprs-and-district-court-patent-litigation.html [https://perma.cc/
9D8W-YKEK].
175. Id.
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patent validity that may be raised are much fewer. 176 The scope of discovery
is much narrower in an IPR, but only in an IPR may a patent owner move to
amend claims. 177 And while district courts use live testimony, the PTAB prefers written declarations with cross-examination of deponents. 178
These procedural differences matter less when it comes to claim construction. Restricted discovery and absence of live testimony have little relevance. Under patent law doctrine, a standard evidentiary hierarchy is followed, with the most important evidence being the patent’s specification and
plain meanings of a claim term—both available in an IPR. 179 Additionally,
burden-of-proof differences are irrelevant to claim construction, which is a
question primarily of law, albeit based on underlying factual determinations. 180 Overall, these differences echo those raised (and rejected as insufficient) in B & B Hardware. 181
Even where IPR procedure differs, mere difference does not defeat preclusion unless there is a categorical “reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness” of the proceeding. 182 The Court has offered little guidance
on what such a categorical reason might be, but it has indicated that in such
a case the burden of persuasion rests with a party claiming unfairness. 183
Importantly, the USPTO has generally adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence for IPRs. 184 The Federal Circuit has also generally found procedural

176. Id. For example, district court issues include infringement, various affirmative defenses, and any ground of invalidity, whereas IPRs are limited to unpatentability on the
grounds of novelty or obviousness.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See generally Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1311–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
banc) (detailing evidentiary hierarchy); see also id. at 1315 (“[T]he specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide
to the meaning of a disputed term.” (cleaned up)).
180. E.g., Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 838 (2015); AK Steel
Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 234 F. Supp. 2d 711, 718 n.6 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (noting that as a question of law, evidentiary burdens generally do not apply to claim construction).
181. Cf. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1309 (2015) (“No
one disputes that the TTAB and district courts use different procedures. Most notably, district
courts feature live witnesses. Procedural differences, by themselves, however, do not defeat issue preclusion. Equity courts used different procedures than did law courts, but that did not
bar issue preclusion.”).
182. Id. at 1309 (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 164 n.11 (1979)); see
also id. (“Rather than focusing on whether procedural differences exist—they often will—the
correct inquiry is whether the procedures used in the first proceeding were fundamentally
poor, cursory, or unfair.”).
183. Id.
184. 37 C.F.R. § 42.62(a) (2017) (adopting Federal Rules of Evidence as default for PTAB
proceedings); cf. B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1300 (noting that TTAB procedures “are largely
governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence”).
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sufficiency at the PTAB, 185 and the Supreme Court has endorsed the fairness
of using different legal standards in IPR than in a district court.186 Further,
the PTAB is governed by the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act
meant to ensure procedural fairness. 187
Granted, some do doubt the procedural fairness of the PTAB—
sometimes colorfully. 188 But if procedures for claim construction at IPR are
categorically unfair, this raises bigger concerns about the constitutionality of
IPR in general. 189 Conversely, if the procedure at the PTAB is sufficiently fair
for patent cancellation, it should seemingly be enough for preclusion regarding claim scope. Additionally, if in individual cases the PTAB procedure is
inadequate, the ordinary law of issue preclusion “already accounts for those
‘rare’ cases where a ‘compelling showing of unfairness’ can be made”—an
equitable safety valve. 190
3.

Identity of the Issues: A Stumbling Block?

Perhaps the biggest concern in application of preclusion is the identity
of the issues. If the issues are not actually the same, preclusion does not apply. 191 Formally, the PTAB and district courts apply two different legal
standards in claim construction. The PTAB uses the “broadest reasonable

185. See, e.g., Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]he
rules and practices of the Board generally protect against loss of patent rights without the required notice and opportunity to respond.”).
186. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2145 (2016).
187. See, e.g., Belden, 805 F.3d at 1080 (characterizing inter partes review as formal adjudication subject to the APA); 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2012) (formal adjudications); Rapp v. U.S. Dep’t
of the Treasury, 52 F.3d 1510, 1519 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Section 554 of the APA requires procedural fairness in the administrative process.”); United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 912, 919 (1st
Cir. 1987) (characterizing APA’s adjudicatory rules as “designed to ensure procedural fairness”).
188. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, The Only Solution for the Transgressions of the PTAB Is to
Disband This Runaway Tribunal, IPWatchdog (Sept. 11, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/
2017/09/11/solution-ptab-disband-runaway-tribunal/ [https://perma.cc/6562-P3AR] (questioning procedural sufficiency of the PTAB and opining that “the PTAB is a kangaroo
court . . . that you might expect in a third world nation suffering from a complete collapse of
the judiciary”).
189. However, the constitutionality of IPR was recently upheld by the Supreme Court as
not contrary to Article III. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S.
Ct. 1365 (2018). Only two justices—Justice Gorsuch and Chief Justice Roberts—dissented, lamenting the majority’s opinion as “a retreat from Article III’s guarantees.” Id. at 1386 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
190. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1309 (2015) (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28, cmt. g & j (Am. Law Inst. 1982)).
191. This is often treated as an independent enumerated element of issue preclusion. See
supra note 106.
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interpretation,” 192 whereas district courts use the narrower Phillips standard,
which inquires of a word’s meaning “to a person of ordinary skill in the
art.” 193
Given their similarity in both theory and practice, the two standards
seem, at first, essentially the same. The Phillips standard prioritizes giving
words their “ordinary and customary meaning . . . to a person of ordinary
skill in the art” informed by the “context of the entire patent, including the
specification.” 194 Likewise, the broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI) seeks
“the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as
they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may
be afforded by the written description contained in the applicant’s specification.” 195 In implementing Phillips, courts turn to “the words of the claims
themselves, the remainder of the specification, the prosecution history, and
extrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific principles, the meaning of
technical terms, and the state of the art.” 196 But the specification and words
of the claims themselves are usually dispositive. 197 Indeed, the main considerations of the Phillips standard—consistency with the specification, the perspective of one of ordinary skill, and preference for plain meaning—are also
integral to the BRI. 198
What, then, is the difference? Essentially, a district court seems to read a
patent in the way it thinks a skilled practitioner probably would (perhaps the
“most likely” reasonable interpretation), whereas the PTAB seems to read a
patent in the most expansive way a skilled practitioner might (the “broadest”
reasonable interpretation). 199 Practical differences do occur. 200 For example,
“computer display window” was construed more broadly in an IPR (the por-

192. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2139 (2016); 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)
(2017) (requiring that a patent claim “shall be given its broadest reasonable construction in
light of the specification of the patent in which it appears”).
193. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
194. Id.
195. In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also In re Smith Int’l, Inc., 871
F.3d 1375, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
196. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314.
197. See supra note 179.
198. See Laura E. Dolbow, Note, A Distinction Without a Difference: Convergence in
Claim Construction Standards, 70 Vand. L. Rev. 1071, 1097–98 (2017) (“[G]iven the similarity
of the guiding principles, interpreters apply many of the same interpretation rules to construe
claims under both the Phillips and BRI standards. Some specific interpretation rules common
to both . . . are used with particular frequency.”).
199. But the theoretical differences in the standards are vague at best. See id. at 1083–84.
200. But see id. at 1089, 1100–03 (suggesting that differences arise from “inherent ambiguities in interpretation or litigant behavior rather than a difference between the legal standards”).
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tion of a display screen in which a set of information is displayed) than in a
prior district court action (also requiring a graphical user interface). 201
As a matter of law, the PTAB’s BRI may be the same as the Phillips construction or may be broader; it may not be narrower. 202 Thus, the two are
subject to a one-directional legal relationship, but they may also come out
the same way in a particular instance. 203 Both require consistency with the
patent specification, 204 and the Federal Circuit has clarified that the PTAB is
not to adopt the “broadest possible interpretation.” 205
Moreover, B & B Hardware implies that sufficient identity of the issues
may exist when two purportedly different legal standards formally rooted in
different texts are nonetheless “in essence” the same standard. 206 For example, in B & B Hardware, although district court and TTAB standards typically examined different breadth of a mark’s usage, 207 this question of narrow or
broad usage was not present in the case at hand because the TTAB had con-

201. Compare Rackspace Hosting, Inc. v. Rotatable Techs. LLC, No. IPR2013-00248,
2014 WL 4732552, at *4–6 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 19, 2014), with Rotatable Techs. LLC v. Nokia, No.
2:12-CV-265-JRG, 2013 WL 3992930, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2013).
202. Facebook, Inc. v. Pragmatus AV, LLC, 582 F. App’x 864, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The
broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim term may be the same as or broader than the construction of a term under the Phillips standard. But it cannot be narrower.”).
203. E.g., Dolbow, supra note 198 (arguing based on empirical evidence that the different
claim construction standards have “largely converged in practice”); see also Timothy R.
Holbrook, The Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s Evolving Impact on Claim Construction, 24
Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 301, 330–31 (2016). Dolbow developed a database of IPR final written
decisions and showed that in practice, “the BRI operates in a circular manner, largely citing
legal authority that originates from the Phillips regime.” Dolbow, supra note 198, at 1084.
204. Compare In re Smith Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (clarifying
that the BRI “is an interpretation that corresponds with what and how the inventor describes
his invention in the specification, i.e., an interpretation that is ‘consistent with the specification.’ ” (quoting In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997))), with Phillips v. AWH
Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“Importantly, the person of ordinary
skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim
in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.”).
205. E.g., Smith Int’l, 871 F.3d at 1383.
206. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1306–07 (2015) (“For
one thing, the factors are not fundamentally different, and ‘[m]inor variations in the application of what is in essence the same legal standard do not defeat preclusion.’ ” (alteration in
original) (quoting Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 312 n.9 (2011))). The comments to the
Restatement also suggest that identity-of-issue requirements are not strict and formalistic. See
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, cmt. c (Am. Law Inst. 1982) (“When there is a
lack of total identity between the particular matter presented . . . there are several factors that
should be considered . . . for example: Is there a substantial overlap between the evidence or
argument . . . ? Does the new evidence or argument involve . . . the same rule of
law . . . ? . . . How closely related are the claims involved . . . ?”).
207. See supra note 109.
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sidered the mark’s actual use. 208 There, the Court concluded that for identical uses, the question was essentially the same between the TTAB and a district court. 209 So differing breadth was arguably absent. This is not necessarily so between the PTAB and district courts. In addition to different
nomenclature and definitions, varying policy goals underlie the two. The
district court standard seeks to divine the construction that is most correct in
light of the inventor’s intent, motivated by the public notice function of patents, uniformity, and judicial efficiency. 210 In contrast, the BRI seeks to divine the reasonable outer bounds of a claim’s scope. 211 And where the BRI is
usually prospectively employed before a patent issues, district courts operate
retrospectively under a presumption of patent validity. 212
Thus, the difference between the BRI and Phillips standards may seem to
be a nuance, but it is real. Consequently, if issue preclusion is to be applied to
IPR claim construction decisions, a solution is needed which reconciles the
two standards.
IV. The “Broadest Reasonable Interpretation” as a Preclusive
Outer Bound on District Court Claim Construction
Can a theory of issue preclusion for claim construction be maintained in
the face of the tension between the BRI and Phillips standards? This Part asserts that the “ordinary elements” of issue preclusion would be satisfied by
treating the PTAB’s broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI) of a patent
claim term as a preclusive outer bound in subsequent district court claim
construction. Section IV.A considers whether wholesale issue preclusion as
to claim meaning is appropriate given the substantively similar practical outcomes under both the BRI and Phillips standards. Section IV.B proposes an
alternative outer-bounds preclusion theory that satisfies both the policy considerations underlying claim construction as well as the principles of issue
preclusion.
A. Wholesale Issue Preclusion as to Claim Construction is Inappropriate
Issue preclusion could apply to the entire content of a claim’s construction, rather than simply the outer bounds. The doctrinal and pragmatic similarity of claim constructions under the BRI and district court standards suggest this might be appropriate. 213 It is tempting to rely on this similarity and
to treat claim construction under the BRI and under Phillips as the same is-

208. See B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1308 (cautioning against applying issue preclusion
where usages not the same).
209. Id.
210. See Dolbow, supra note 198, at 1081.
211. See id. at 1081–83.
212. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012) (presumption of validity); see also Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd.
P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 102 (2011) (discussing common law origins of presumption).
213. See supra Section III.B.3.
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sue—after all, the outcome would likely be the same under either in many
cases. But ultimately, such wholesale issue preclusion would be inappropriate. The BRI and Phillips standard are analytically different and have separate underlying policy goals.
The functionalist test for legal standard equivalence articulated in B & B
Hardware suggests that the two claim construction standards might be the
same issue for preclusion purposes. Indeed, issue preclusion in the PTAB–
district court context arguably might make more sense than in the TTAB–
district court context, yet the Supreme Court endorsed the latter in B & B
Hardware. 214 There, two different multifactor tests for likelihood of confusion between trademarks were at issue. But Robert Bone and Barton Beebe,
among others, have argued that the differences in likelihood-of-confusion
standards among circuit courts are in fact not the same and produce “inconsistent formulation[s] and application.” 215 Nonetheless, the Court found that
“in essence” the same issue was being determined by the two tests at issue in
B & B Hardware—whether two marks are likely to be confused. 216 One could
also argue that the PTAB and a district court are seeking “in essence” to determine the same issue—what a patent claim term means—and are doing so
largely using the same evidence with the same substantive results. 217
This, however, would run contrary to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the doctrinal basis of the BRI and Phillips standards themselves, as
conveyed in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee. 218 There, the Court considered whether the Patent Office could promulgate regulations requiring
the PTAB to use the BRI standard, as opposed to Phillips, in IPR proceedings. 219 In holding such regulations to be proper, the court implicitly recognized that the standards were doctrinally distinct. It noted that “inconsistent
results” might be generated with two different standards in play but that the
PTAB’s use of the BRI standard “helps to protect the public” by encouraging
patents to be drafted narrowly. 220
This doctrinal difference parallels the policy differences that underscore
each standard. 221 The BRI is concerned with encouraging narrow patent

214. See supra Part II.
215. Robert G. Bone, Taking the Confusion Out of “Likelihood of Confusion”: Toward a
More Sensible Approach to Trademark Infringement, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1307, 1308–09 (2012)
(noting likelihood of confusion tests); accord Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1581, 1582, 1591 (2006).
216. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1306–07 (2015).
217. See supra Section III.B.3.
218. 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016).
219. Cuozzo Speed Techs., 136 S. Ct. at 2142–46.
220. Id. at 2144–46.
221. See supra notes 210–212 and accompanying text.
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drafting by broadly interpreting claims when ambiguities are present. 222 This
standard, adopted not only by the PTAB in IPR but also by the Patent Office
in both examination and reexamination, is primarily aimed at avoiding the
anticompetitive effects of issuing patents with overbroad protection. 223 In
contrast, the Phillips standard has the technological practitioner in mind, directing the court to resolve ambiguities as they would be resolved by a person of ordinary skill in the art. 224 The BRI standard thus applies to the patent
in isolation; the Phillips standard occurs foremost in the context of the patent where a potentially infringing technology is also in question.
Nor are the equitable safety valves of issue preclusion law sufficient to
endorse wholesale issue preclusion. These safety valves are largely based on
questions of adequate procedure. 225 Indeed, application of issue preclusion
rules presupposes substantive identity of issues. 226 But differences in application of the Phillips and BRI constructions, when they exist, are based on
questions of substance—that is, the possible difference between a claim’s interpretive outer bounds and its operative meaning. Where these standards
diverge, they do not diverge for procedural reasons.
Thus, while it is tempting to endorse wholesale preclusion, the standards’ differing policy justifications render this inappropriate. Deference
might instead be fitting. 227 Some district courts do treat PTAB claim constructions this way, affording them “reasoned deference” and requiring justification to depart from the PTAB construction. 228 But wholesale preclusion
is not suitable while the PTAB and district courts use formally different
standards. 229

222. Cuozzo Speed Techs., 136 S. Ct. at 2144–45 (“Because an examiner’s (or reexaminer’s) use of the broadest reasonable construction standard increases the possibility that the examiner will find the claim too broad (and deny it), use of that standard encourages the applicant to draft narrowly.”).
223. See Dolbow, supra note 198, at 1082–83.
224. See id. at 1080.
225. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 (Am. Law Inst. 1982) (enumerating exceptions to issue preclusion, including unavailability of review, differences in quality and
extensiveness of procedures, differences in burden of persuasion).
226. See id. § 27.
227. A more nuanced discussion of deference in the framework of administrative proceedings in general, and claim construction in particular, is beyond the scope of this Note. See
generally Gavin P.W. Murphy, Note, Revising Markman: A Procedural Reform to Patent Litigation, 95 Tex. L. Rev. 1425, 1431–35 (2017) (discussing potential legal reforms to bolster court
deference to the USPTO as a matter of administrative law).
228. See, e.g., Contentguard Holdings, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., Nos. 2:13-CV-1112JRG, 2:14-CV-61-JRG, 2015 WL 8073722, at *11 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2015).
229. Note that as of the time of this writing, the PTO has—in the wake of Oil States—
issued a notice of proposed rulemaking seeking to unify the PTAB’s claim construction with
the Phillips standard. See Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims
in Trial Proceedings Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,221 (proposed
May 9, 2018). Promulgation of this regulation would make wholesale issue preclusion palata-
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B. An Outer-Bounds Preclusion Theory: Embracing the Differences Between
the BRI and Phillips Standards
The prescribed legal relationship between the BRI and Phillips standards
enables the adoption of an issue preclusion theory wherein the BRI is preclusive as an outer bound of a claim’s meaning in a later Phillips-governed proceeding—here deemed “outer-bounds preclusion.” Outer-bounds preclusion
openly treats the BRI and the Phillips construction as two different issues.
As emphasized in the case law, there is a prescribed relationship between
the BRI and the district court standard. 230 The BRI may be broader than the
district court construction. 231 The BRI may be equivalent to the district court
construction. 232 But the BRI may not be narrower than the district court
construction. 233 Thus, because the district court standard may not be broader than the BRI, it follows that the BRI should at least be preclusive as an
“outer bound” of claim construction in a subsequent district court setting.
The BRI and the district court claim construction standards can be viewed as
two closely related “shells” of scope (e.g., two concentric circles) rather than
two distinct and unrelated standards that sometimes overlap (e.g., the two
circles making up a Venn diagram).
Under this theory, the PTAB’s BRI is preclusive in later litigation as to
the broadest of all reasonable constructions. The district court then decides
whether the Phillips construction is, too, the broadest reasonable one or
whether a narrower reasonable construction is more appropriate. In other
words, the PTAB’s determination is preclusive as to the issue of the BRI, in
which the BRI is a subsidiary issue which preclusively determines the outer
bounds, as a matter of law, of the separate issue of the Phillips construction.
This embraces, rather than disguises, the doctrinal differences between the
BRI and the Phillips standard while also accommodating their doctrinal and
pragmatic similarities.
For example, consider the previously discussed claim term “computer
display window.” 234 One question might be whether, in the context of the
claimed invention, such a display window needed to include a “graphical user interface”—a narrower patent claim scope than if such a requirement were
omitted. Suppose an IPR on the patent came first, and the PTAB found that
the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim term did include this requirement. In a subsequent district court action, the patent owner would
ble. The question of district-court preclusion based on the BRI, however, would likely remain
for patents that had undergone an IPR under the old standard.
230. Facebook, Inc. v. Pragmatus AV, LLC, 582 F. App’x 864, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The
broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim term may be the same as or broader than the construction of a term under the Phillips standard. But it cannot be narrower.”).
231. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., Contentguard Holdings, 2015 WL 8073722, at *11.
233. Facebook, 582 F. App’x at 869.
234. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
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then be able to argue for a narrower interpretation (e.g., that the window included a “graphical user interface” and a “glass screen”) but not a broader
one (e.g., that the window did not require a “graphical user interface” at all).
A litigant might object that issue preclusion is inappropriate because the
PTAB could get the determination of the BRI wrong, perhaps due to legal
error or specific procedural inadequacies. Ordinary preclusion law, however,
offers equitable safety valves to account for this possibility. 235 A patent owner
who felt that the PTAB erred in its BRI but who, having prevailed at the
PTAB, was unable to appeal the construction, could point to the unavailability of review or a material procedural difference in her specific case as a reason to depart from preclusion. 236 Importing existing issue preclusion case
law into the PTAB context—as the Supreme Court did in the TTAB context 237—also imports these equitable safety valves and accommodates foreseeable objections to preclusion. Additionally, claim construction determinations by the PTAB are reviewable by the Federal Circuit, providing for lelegal review by an Article III court. 238
Outer-bounds preclusion would further policy aims of claim construction and the patent system in general. In applying the BRI preclusively as an
outer bound, a patent owner would be prevented from improperly benefiting
from “Schrödinger’s patent.” A narrow construction in a validity analysis at
the PTAB would prevent a broader construction in an infringement analysis
in district court, for instance. Preventing such oscillation would vindicate the
public notice function of patent law, as well as further the notion that a patent should have as unified a meaning as possible across jurisdictional settings. 239 Indeed, not applying preclusion in this way could be harmful. If a
patent owner were allowed to broaden their patent’s coverage beyond the
“broadest reasonable” scope, a technological practitioner (i.e., potential infringer) might detrimentally rely on the supposed “broadest reasonable interpretation” of a previous IPR proceeding on that patent.
Thus, the outer-bounds preclusion theory is consistent with the policy
concerns at issue. It is aligned with the purpose of the AIA, the policy rationale behind claim construction doctrines, general principles of judicial
economy and procedural fairness, and the Supreme Court’s seemingly functionalist issue preclusion jurisprudence.

235. E.g., Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 (Am. Law Inst. 1982).
236. See id. § 28(1) (providing for exception to issue preclusion where review of first decision unavailable); id. § 28(3) (providing for exception to issue preclusion for reasons of procedural inadequacy).
237. See B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1303 (2015).
238. See, e.g., ClassCo, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 838 F.3d 1214, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (delineating standard of review).
239. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 7 (examining varying scope of patent rights in
various law patent law doctrines (validity, infringement, defenses) and arguing for an integrated doctrine of scope); Lemley, supra note 29, at 110 (arguing for a fixed meaning of patent
terms over time).
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Conclusion
The scope of patent rights is central to various Article I and Article III
proceedings, but preclusive effect is not consistent across these settings. This
increases the ex ante uncertainty of patent scope. So far, despite the establishment of the PTAB as a specialist body for adjudicating patent validity,
courts have been hesitant to afford preclusive weight to PTAB claim construction prior to appeal. The Supreme Court’s articulation in B & B Hardware of a functionalist two-step test for issue preclusion invites the application of this doctrine to the context of patent claim construction by the
PTAB. The conflict between the two distinct legal standards for claim construction at district court and PTAB proceedings can be resolved by applying
an “outer-bounds preclusion” theory wherein the PTAB’s “broadest reasonable interpretation” serves as an outer bound for a patent’s scope in subsequent litigation. Doing so would be consistent with the public notice function of patent law and would decrease the variability of a patent’s scope
across proceedings.

